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Robledo: An American Dream Gone Green

AN AMERICAN DREAM GONE GREEN: A DISCUSSION OF
EXISTING ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING REGULATIONS
AND THE NEED FOR STRICTER LEGISLATION
Christian Robledo*
ABSTRACT
Many consumers seek to purchase environmentally friendly
products and companies have responded with “green” marketing,
which includes claims of environmental benefits and sustainability
with respect to what is being sold. Unfortunately, these claims often
overstate their impact on the environment or are presented in a way to
mislead consumers. This practice is referred to as greenwashing. Not
only does it harm consumers, but it potentially harms the reputation of
truly eco-friendly companies that are viewed with skepticism or
outright distrust due to the deceitfulness of companies that do engage
in greenwashing.
This Note discusses the lack of legislation that currently exists
to properly punish and deter greenwashing through an examination of
the Lanham Act, the Better Business Bureau’s National Advertising
Division, and the Federal Trade Commission’s Guides for the Use of
Environmental Marketing Claims. Furthermore, it argues that the
Federal Trade Commission’s Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims—while nonbinding—are actually written like
legislative rules, and thus should be promulgated as such to make a
difference in the fight against greenwashing in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION

Now more than ever, the United States is making strides toward
sustainability and true environmental responsibility. The country’s
current focus on these issues has enhanced American citizens’
environmental awareness as well as their sense of accountability,
particularly when making purchases. Many consumers are willing to
open their wallets and pay more—sometimes substantially more—for
a product or service that makes them feel like they are making an
impact, no matter how small. After all, that is how individuals can
effect major global change: with small positive impacts aggregately.
Or perhaps consumers want (or need) their products made a certain
way for health reasons. In truth, there are likely countless reasons why
the demand for sustainable products and services is rising.
From a business perspective, companies recognize that
production expenses for sustainable products are higher than
production expenses for products made with no regard for the
environment or for the health of consumers. As such, for many years,
corporate brand managers have falsely alleged that consumers merely
claim to purchase sustainable products, but do not actually do so.1
Several studies, however, paint a different picture. 2
A study analyzing sales of consumer-packaged goods (“CPG”)
from 2013-2018 revealed that in more than 90% of CPG categories,
sustainability-marketed product sales increased faster than their
conventional counterparts, delivering nearly $114 billion in sales
(approximately 20% of the market). 3 Furthermore, nearly 80% of
consumers are altering purchasing habits based on environmental
1

Tensie Whelan & Randi Kronthal-Sacco, Research: Actually, Consumers Do Buy
Sustainable
Products,
HARV.
BUS.
REV.
(June
19,
2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/06/research-actually-consumers-do-buy-sustainable-products
(stating that due to this common misconception, many brands do not make their
products more sustainable).
2
Id.; Eric Reicin, Businesses Should Be Held Accountable For Their ESG Claims,
FORBES
(Mar.
23,
2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesnonprofitcouncil/2021/03/23/businessesshould-be-held-accountable-for-their-esg-claims/?sh=5c6e1cc55679.
3
Whelan & Kronthal-Sacco, supra note 1. This study was conducted by NYU
Stern’s Center for Sustainable Business using data provided by IRI (a market
research firm). Id. The data was collected from over 36 categories, comprised of
over 71,000 SKUs from retail establishments’ bar scan codes (accounting for 40%
of CPG sales during the five-year period examined). Id.
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impact or social responsibility, 4 and more than 50% of Americans say
they are willing to pay more for a sustainable wearable product. 5
Despite these findings, some companies will continue to resist
embracing sustainability. How long such companies can survive in a
world where environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) factors
are increasingly important to investors is beyond the scope of this
Note.
Conversely, a growing number of companies and corporations
are acutely aware of these environmentally conscious consumers and
are making sustainability a priority. For some, the sustainable products
they market are the same products they sell to their consumers. Yet,
and this may come as no surprise, there are just as many companies
that advertise one thing but deliver another. Undoubtedly, this often
happens unintentionally. Businesses navigating through the everexpanding world of sustainability—a world full of new trends and
novel technologies—are bound to make honest mistakes in how they
advertise a product.
But this Note is not concerned with those well-intentioned
companies. Rather, this Note focuses on the companies attempting to
capitalize on the ever-increasing demand for environmentally sound
products by engaging in a deceitful practice called greenwashing. 6
A.

Background on Greenwashing

Although the term “greenwashing” originated in the mid
many people are unfamiliar with its meaning. Greenwashing
occurs when a company provides deceptive information or conveys a
false impression with respect to its products being environmentally
sound.8 It derives from a similar term, “whitewashing,” which refers
to glossing over negative behavior with the use of misleading
1980s,7

4

Reicin, supra note 2 (referencing a 2020 Capgemini report).
Id. (referencing a 2020 CGS Retail and Fashion Sustainability Survey).
6
Will Kenton, Greenwashing, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Jan. 23, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greenwashing.asp.
7
Jenna Tsui, The Negative Effects of Corporate Greenwashing, SEA GOING GREEN
(Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.seagoinggreen.org/blog/the-negative-effects-ofcorporate-greenwashing (“Environmental activist Jay Westerveld coined the term in
1986 in response to the perceived hypocrisy from a beach resort. The hotel posted
notices about reusing towels to protect nearby reefs while it was in the middle of
expanding into those very waters.”).
8
Kenton, supra note 6.
5
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information.9 Greenwashing can be practiced in various ways,
sometimes even unintentionally, and it can range in scope from a small
company’s ambiguous “green” packaging information to a vast ecofriendly claim made by a fossil fuel company. 10 The various forms of
deceitful environmental marketing have been categorized into the
“seven sins of greenwashing.”11
The “sin of the hidden trade-off” occurs when a product is
presented as “green” based on unreasonably narrow attributes that
ignore other relevant environmental factors. 12 The “sin of no proof” is
committed when no reliable third-party certification or other
supporting information can be easily accessed to substantiate an
environmental claim.13 The “sin of vagueness” occurs when a claim is
so broad that the likelihood of consumer misunderstanding is high. 14
The “sin of irrelevance” is committed when a claim is true but is
irrelevant, or unimportant, to a consumer seeking eco-friendly
products.15 The “sin of lesser of two evils” occurs when a claim is true
but distracts the consumer from a greater environmental or health
concern.16 The “sin of fibbing” simply occurs by making false
environmental claims.17 Finally, the “sin of false labels” exploits

9

Id.
Deena Robinson, 10 Companies and Corporations Called Out For Greenwashing,
EARTH.ORG (Aug. 2, 2021), https://earth.org/greenwashing-companiescorporations/.
11
See Richard Dahl, Green Washing: Do You Know What You’re Buying?, ENV’T
HEALTH
PERSP.
(June
2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2898878/
(referencing
a
TerraChoice environmental marketing report from 2009); Nicole D’Alessandro, 7
Sins of Greenwashing (And 5 Ways to Keep It Out of Your Life), ECOWATCH, (Apr.
23, 2014, 12:59 PM), https://www.ecowatch.com/7-sins-of-greenwashing-and-5ways-to-keep-it-out-of-your-life-1881898598.html.
12
D’Alessandro, supra note 11 (providing an example where paper produced from a
forest that is sustainably harvested will still yield high energy and significant
pollution costs).
13
Id. (providing an example of a paper product claiming certain percentages of
recycled content without supporting evidence).
14
Id. (providing an example with the use of the term “all natural”).
15
Id. (providing an example with the use of the term “CFC-free,” where
chlorofluorocarbons have already been declared illegal, thus making the claim
meaningless).
16
Id. (providing an example with the use of the term “organic cigarettes”).
17
Id. (providing an example where products falsely claim “to be Energy Star
certified”).
10
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consumers’ demand for certifications by third parties and is committed
when products are falsely labeled or claim third-party endorsement.18
While greenwashing has been around for decades, its practice
has increased greatly in recent years.19 Notable companies that have
been caught greenwashing include Volkswagen, BP, ExxonMobil,
Nestlé, Coca-Cola, Starbucks, IKEA, Evian, and H&M.20
Volkswagen “admitted to . . . fitting various vehicles with a
‘defect’ device, with software which could detect when it was
undergoing an emissions test and altering the performance to reduce
the emissions level,” thus enabling the corporate giant to market its
vehicles as eco-friendly and trick its customers.21 More than 96% of
BP’s spending is on oil and gas, yet it advertised its products as using
low-carbon energy.22 ExxonMobil released emission reduction targets
for 2025 which omitted “the vast majority of emissions resulting from
its products.”23 Nestlé’s 2018 statement regarding its ambitions for
100% recyclable or reusable packaging by 2025 was exposed as pure
speculation.24
18

Id. (providing an example where a product label contains certification-like images
containing “green” jargon such as “eco-preferred”).
19
Dahl, supra note 11.
20
Robinson, supra note 10.
21
Id. In a rare occurrence, Volkswagen was held accountable for this deceptive
“Clean Diesel” ad campaign and had to repay more than $9 billion to injured
consumers after reaching a settlement with the Federal Trade Commission which had
filed a complaint in federal court in March 2016. FED. TRADE COMM’N, In Final
Court Summary, FTC Reports Volkswagen Repaid More than $9.5 Billion to Car
Buyers Who Were Deceived by “Clean Diesel” Ad Campaign (July 27, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/07/final-court-summary-ftcreports-volkswagen-repaid-more-than-9-billion.
22
Robinson, supra note 10 (stating that a complaint was lodged against BP “[i]n
December 2019 . . . [by] an environmental group called ClientEarth”).
23
Id. In addition, ExxonMobil recently advertised in a way that implied “its
experimental algae biofuels could one day reduce transport emissions,” yet it “has
no company-wide net zero target . . . .” Id.
24
Id. (stating that Nestlé failed to release any clear targets or timelines to outline
these ambitions, nor did it lay out efforts to facilitate recycling by its consumers).
Greenpeace is a global network of organizations that exposes global environmental
problems. GREENPEACE, https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/about (last visited Nov. 7,
2021). In a released statement in response to Nestlé’s greenwashing, Greenpeace
stated:
Nestlé’s statement on plastic packaging includes more of the same
greenwashing baby steps to tackle a crisis it helped to create. It will
not actually move the needle toward the reduction of single-use
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Coca-Cola falsely advertised its packaging as sustainable and
eco-friendly despite being ranked as the number one plastic polluter in
the world.25 In fact, Coca-Cola produces more plastic pollution than
Pepsi and Nestlé combined, which are numbers two and three in the
rankings, respectively.26 Starbucks’ so-called sustainable “straw-less
lid” contained more plastic than its previous straw and lid
combination.27 IKEA, long considered eco-friendly, was linked to
Forest Stewardship Council, an organization known for greenwashing
in the timber industry.28 Evian and other notable plastic water bottle
companies depict nature on their labels, yet their bottles are designed
for single use and therefore contribute to the global plastic pollution
crisis.29 H&M launched a “green” line with alleged environmental
benefits yet failed to provide any information regarding these claims
of sustainability.30
Nonetheless, these greenwashing antics are not exclusive to
retail-based corporations.31 Major banks such as CitiGroup, JP
Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo, to name a few, are some of the worst

plastics in a meaningful way, and sets an incredibly low standard
as the largest food and beverage company in the world.
Robinson, supra note 10.
25
Robinson, supra note 10 (stating that despite its eco-friendly claims, the company
announced that due to popularity with customers, it would not abandon plastic
bottles).
26
See Karen McVeigh, Coca-Cola, Pepsi and Nestlé Named Top Plastic Polluters
for Third Year in a Row, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/dec/07/coca-cola-pepsi-andnestle-named-top-plastic-polluters-for-third-year-in-a-row (referencing an annual
audit performed by Break Free From Plastic where more than 15,000 global
volunteers identify “the largest number of plastic products from global brands found
in the highest number of countries”).
27
Robinson, supra note 10. Starbucks did not deny this, instead claiming the “strawless lid” was made from a recycled plastic, polypropylene. Id. Be that as it may, only
nine percent of the world’s plastic is recycled so most of its lids will end up in the
ocean. Id.
28
Id. In addition, IKEA sources conflict timber, which is wood that has been traded
or taxed by armed factions. Id.
29
Id. (listing Poland Spring and Deer Park as the other greenwashing water bottle
companies).
30
Id. Similar companies like Zara and Uniqlo have also been caught greenwashing
in recent history; moreover, all these fashion brands contribute enormously to global
textile waste, where only 20% is said to be recycled. Id.
31
Id.
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greenwashing offenders in the world. 32 But how can multi-national
corporations like these engage in greenwashing and face little to no
legal consequences for their deceitful and immoral actions? 33 The
answer to this question is not a simple one.
B.

Consumer Confusion and an Introduction to
Existing Regulations

Part of the problem stems from the fact that it is often
impossible for consumers to recognize that a company is greenwashing
because environmental claims are “credence claims” – claims that are
unverifiable by a consumer – as opposed to “experience claims” which
deal with individual use attributes.34 For example, a consumer can
purchase toilet paper and easily test the company’s claim of extreme
softness (experience claim), but testing the company’s claim that the
toilet paper is organic (credence claim) would prove rather difficult, if
not impossible. Most consumers lack the technical and specific
knowledge required to consider whether an environmental credence
claim about a product is valid. 35
According to economic theory, purely rational consumers
should “discount credence claims entirely” due to their unverifiable
nature.36 Given how often sustainability-related credence claims are
used, it is apparent that corporations are not targeting “rational”
consumers.37 Interestingly, many consumers will be convinced by
See id. (stating that while these banks offer “green investment” opportunities, they
also lend huge sums of money to industries highly responsible for global warming);
see also Chris Skinner, Greenwashing the System: Which Banks Are Worst?, CHRIS
SKINNER’S BLOG (May 12, 2021), https://thefinanser.com/2021/05/greenwashingthe-system-which-banks-are-worst.html (ranking the worst banks for the funding of
fossil fuels as JP Morgan, CitiGroup, and Wells Fargo as the top three, respectively).
33
See D’Alessandro, supra note 11 (stating that it comes down to consumers to let
businesses know dishonesty will not be tolerated).
34
Rebecca Tushnet, A Threat to Consumer Empowerment: Greenwashing, REBECCA
TUSHNET’S
43(B)LOG
(Mar.
21,
2009,
2:34
PM),
https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2009/03/hofstra-conference-on-energy-and.html.
35
Ashley Lorance, An Assessment of U.S. Responses to Greenwashing and Proposals
to Improve Enforcement, HOFSTRA L. STUDENT WORKS, 2 (2010),
https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&conte
xt=hofstra_law_student_works.
36
Tushnet, supra note 34. For a brief discussion on how this theory relates to why
the Lanham Act is an inefficient means for consumers seeking relief for
greenwashing, see infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
37
Id.
32
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credence claims over time because they become familiarized enough
to trust them; in other words, consumers will forget about considering
what source or evidence companies use to make these claims, and
instead will only remember that the claim was made.38 Remarkably,
even skeptics can eventually find credence claims credible.39
The result is that consumers ultimately purchase sustainable
products as “an act of symbolism and faith,” and sadly, in some cases,
they narrowly focus on the credence claim to feel proud of their
purchase while ignoring obvious negative environmental attributes. 40
As evidenced by these examples, companies can successfully use
distracting or limited green claims to induce purchasing.41
Therefore, it is not the least bit shocking that the use of this
deceptive practice leads to massive consumer confusion and sullies the
entire decision-making process when making purchases.42 As such,
state and federal governments have attempted, rather unsuccessfully,
to properly regulate this type of false advertising.
And therein lies the true answer to the question posited earlier
which asked: How can corporations engage in greenwashing and face
little to no legal consequences for their deceitful and immoral actions?
38

Id.
Id.
40
Id. A New York Times article from 2007 reported the number one reason Toyota
Prius purchases are made is because “it shows the world that its owner cares,” and a
2010 study provided that consumers making a green purchase are motivated by
elevating their social status. Robin M. Rotman et al., Article, Greenwashing No
More: The Case for Stronger Regulation of Environmental Marketing, 72 ADMIN. L.
REV. 417, 419 (2020).
41
Tushnet, supra note 34. The amount of greenwashing in recent years has caused
consumer distrust to increase in companies’ environmental claims, but its powerful
effects still induce purchasing by a significant number of American consumers.
Michele Koch & Zach Harris, GreenPrint Survey Finds Consumers Want to Buy
Eco-Friendly Products, but Don’t Know How to Identify Them, BUSINESSWIRE (Mar.
22,
2021,
08:30
AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210322005061/en/GreenPrintSurvey-Finds-Consumers-Want-to-Buy-Eco-Friendly-Products-butDon%E2%80%99t-Know-How-to-Identify-Them. A 2021 GreenPrint study “found
a large degree of mistrust about companies’ environmental claims. . . . with 53% of
Americans never or only sometimes believing such claims.” Id. However, the study
also provided that “78% of people are more likely to purchase a product that is clearly
labeled as environmentally friendly.” Id. The use of green certification marks—a
certification by a third party—is helpful to consumers, as “45% of Americans say
they need a third-party validating source.” Id.
42
Lorance, supra note 35, at 3.
39
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It is because of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of current federal
legislation. And with respect to state legislation, it is evident that
states’ attempts at regulating greenwashing are fraught with problems
and cannot be the solution.
Historically, statutes have been enacted that allow states to seek
equitable, monetary, and criminal penalties against false advertisers,
and in some circumstances even provide an avenue of relief for
consumers.43 The problem is that each state separately interprets and
enforces its own statutes. 44 When up against the might of national and
multi-national corporations with seemingly unlimited resources, this
lack of state-wide uniformity creates an inefficient mess that mainly
results in settlements.45
Settlements are a mild consequence for corporations with deep
pockets, and this type of remedy utterly fails at deterring
greenwashing. A solution must be found within the broad scope of
power that only federal legislation can provide. Unfortunately, current
federal legislation is simply not cutting it.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the Lanham Act, and
to a lesser degree, the Better Business Bureau’s National Advertising
Division, all provide lackluster avenues for relief. Part II of this Note
discusses the ineffectiveness of both the Lanham Act and the Better
Business Bureau’s National Advertisement Division with respect to
regulating and deterring greenwashing. Part III, the focus of this Note,
discusses the FTC’s Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing
Claims (“Green Guides”) as being ineffective in their current
incarnation for the purpose of punishing and deterring greenwashing.
No other body of federal legislation comes close to fully encompassing
the proper means for advertising and marketing environmentally sound
products as well as the Green Guides do. While they are mere guides,
they appear facially to be legislative rules and thus are the closest thing
this nation has to proper greenwashing laws. Developing a new set of
rules would just be inefficient. As such, the Green Guides should not
merely exist as interpretive guidance. They are in the perfect position
to be promulgated as binding regulations that can finally deter
corporate greenwashing successfully in this country.
43

Glenn Israel, Comment, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National
Standards for Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 303,
312 (1993).
44
Id. at 313.
45
Id. at 314.
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THE LANHAM ACT AND THE BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU’S
NATIONAL ADVERTISEMENT DIVISION
A.

The Lanham Act

The Lanham Act was passed by Congress just over seventy five
years ago on July 5, 1946.46 While Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
was originally narrowly interpreted to solely prohibit trademark
infringement, its scope of power broadened over the years to also
prohibit common law trademark infringement, trade dress
infringement, and—as is relevant here—false advertisement, which
includes “other practices falling within the rubric [of] ‘unfair
competition.’”47 In fact, by creating “a private cause of action for false
advertisement,”48 the Lanham Act provides an avenue, albeit a narrow
one, to hold corporations liable for greenwashing. 49 However, the
Lanham Act cannot be a truly effective means for consumers seeking
to combat greenwashing due to its many shortfalls within this
context.50
First, the relevant provisions of Section 43(a) dealing with
false advertisement will be discussed. Thus, Section 43(a) provides
that:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce
any word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . or any
false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, which . . . in commercial advertising
46

Ethan Horwitz and Benjamin Levi, Half a Century of Federal Trademark
Protection: The Lanham Act Turns Fifty: Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A
Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 59,
63 (1996).
47
Id. at 59-60.
48
Robert B. White, Note, Preemption in Green Marketing: The Case for Uniform
Federal Marketing Definitions, 85 IND. L. J. 325, 329 (2010).
49
See Marc McAree and Gieselle Davidian, Greenbiz and Getting to Market: What
it Takes to Go Green and Limit Liability, THE BRIEF (Apr. 25, 2019)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_trial_insurance_practice/publications/the
_brief/2016_17/winter/greenbiz_and_getting_to_market_what_it_takes_to_go_gree
n_and_limit_liability/#ref39.
50
Lorance, supra note 35, at 13.
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or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services or commercial activities, shall
be liable in civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 51
This means that any marketing practices, whether entirely untrue, or
even literally true but “misleading or deceiving to the target audience,”
will create a cause of action. 52 As such, this closely resembles the
standard for bringing a false advertisement action under Section 5 of
the FTC Act.53 However, one major difference between the two acts
with respect to greenwashing claims is that where the FTC provides
guidance for environmental marketing under its Green Guides, the
Lanham Act is silent. 54 Furthermore, another shortfall of the Lanham
Act within the greenwashing context exists in who may have standing
to bring a claim.
While Section 43(a), on its face, provides an avenue of relief
for consumers, many courts have held that private consumer
individuals lack standing to bring false advertisement claims under the
Lanham Act.55 As provided in Made in the USA Found. v. Phillips
51

15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a) (LexisNexis 2021). See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:24 (5th ed. 2017)
[hereinafter 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS].
52
White, supra note 48. In a 2008 article, Rebecca Tushnet discusses how “false
advertising cases can pit technical versus lay definitions.” Rebecca Tushnet, It
Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227, 233 (2008). In a relevant
example, she explains:
Sometimes advertisers have idiosyncratic—even Clintonesque—
definitions of terms like “recycling,” as with Lexmark's contention
that incinerating used printer cartridges constitutes “thermal
recycling,” thus legitimating its ads claiming that Lexmark
"recycles" cartridges. If a substantial percentage of its customers
(most courts accept 15-20 percent as a substantial percentage)
believe that “recycling” means something other than reducing
plastic to ash, Lexmark is engaged in false advertising in violation
of the Lanham Act.
Id. at 234. See infra text accompanying notes 61-68, for a more in-depth discussion
of false and misleading statements under 43(a).
53
White, supra note 48. at 329-30. See discussion infra Part III.
54
White, supra note 48, at 330. For the relevance of this difference between the two
acts, see infra text accompanying notes 69-73.
55
5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 51, at 27:39. As the Supreme Court
has stated, “A consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing product
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Foods, Inc.,56 many of the circuits have held, without disagreement
from others, that Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act bars consumers from
bringing claims under any provision of the Act. 57 As a result, typical
plaintiffs for such claims under the Lanham Act are businesses. 58 That
being said, it is not impossible for private consumers to bring false
advertisement claims under the Lanham Act, but bringing
greenwashing actions involving broad, general claims about
environmental benefits is nearly impossible. 59 To explain this, the
elements of a successful false advertisement claim under the Lanham
Act must be analyzed.
In Verisign Inc. v. XYZ.COM LLC,60 the Fourth Circuit
explained that to succeed on a false advertisement claim under Section
43(a), a plaintiff must satisfy the following five elements by
demonstrating that:

may well have an injury-in-fact . . . but he cannot invoke the protection of the Lanham
Act.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. 572 U.S. 118, 132
(2014).
56
365 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2004).
57
Id. at 280. For relevant holdings from the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits, see Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, 442 F.2d 686, 692
(2d Cir. 1971) (“Congress’ purpose in enacting §43(a) was to create a[n] . . . unfair
competition remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers . . . and
certainly without any consideration of consumer rights . . . . The Act’s purpose, as
defined in §45, is exclusively to protect the interests of a purely commercial class
against unscrupulous commercial conduct.”); Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., Inc., 11
F.3d 1163, 1179 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that Congress “did not contemplate that
federal courts should entertain claims brought by consumers” when enacting the
Act); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 561 (5th Cir. 2001)
(stating that § 45 of the Act provides that plaintiffs with proper standing are ones that
possess commercial interests); Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest Corp.,
871 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the typical plaintiff bringing a 43(a)
action must be a business competitor injured “as a result of false advertisement”);
Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[I]n order to satisfy standing
[under the Lanham Act], the plaintiff must allege commercial injury . . . and also that
the injury was competitive . . . .”); Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., 52 F.3d 867, 873
(10th Cir. 1995) (stating that a plaintiff with proper standing under the Lanham Act
will be a competitor of the defendant and its asserted injury must be competitive in
nature).
58
Phillips Foods, 365 F.3d at 280.
59
Elizabeth K. Coppolecchia, Note, The Greenwashing Deluge: Who Will Rise
Above the Waters of Deceptive Advertisement?, 64 U. MIA. L. REV. 1353, 1387
(2010).
60
848 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2017).
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(1) [T]he defendant made a false or misleading
description of fact or representation of fact in a
commercial advertisement about his own or another's
product; (2) the misrepresentation is material, in that it
is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (3) the
misrepresentation actually deceives or has the tendency
to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; (4) the
defendant placed the false or misleading statement in
interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is
likely to be injured as a result of the misrepresentation,
either by direct diversion of sales or by a lessening of
goodwill associated with its products. 61
The biggest obstacle to establishing a successful greenwashing claim
involves the first two elements, which will prove troublesome to
satisfy.62 In analyzing the falsity aspect of the first element, courts
have generally categorized false statements into two categories: claims
that are literally false, and claims that are implicitly false or “literally
true but misleading.”63 As explained in Part I of this Note,
greenwashing can take many forms, including “the sin of vagueness,”
which refers to overly broad environmental claims.64
Such
greenwashing claims would certainly fall into the second classification
comprised of misleading or implicitly false statements, as would
several of the other types of greenwashing practices included in the
“seven sins of greenwashing.” This is particularly significant when
examining the second element provided in Verisign.
The second element, which deals with consumer confusion, is
automatically satisfied upon satisfaction of the first element by a

Id. at 298-99. If a plaintiff seeks monetary damages, he or she “must additionally
prove that the defendant’s advertising, in violation of Section 43(a) caused the
plaintiff to suffer ‘actual damages.’” Coppolecchia, supra note 59, at 1389.
62
See Coppolecchia, supra note 59, at 1390-91.
63
Id. at 1390. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 382 (7th Cir.
2018) (citing Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1999));
see also LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 948 (N.D.
Ill. 2009) (“Federal false advertising claims generally fall into two categories: literal
falsity and implied falsity.”).
64
See Dahl, supra note 11; see also The 7 Sins of Greenwashing: A Bluedot
Environmental Perspective, BLUEDOT MARKETING (June 4, 2021),
https://bluedotmarketing.cadthe-7-sins-of-greenwashing.
61
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patently false advertisement claim. 65 In other words, the advertisement
would need to fall within the first category of false statements: ones
that are literally false. When the advertisement claim is categorized as
implicitly false, however, the plaintiff will carry a stricter burden of
proof.66 Under an implicitly false scenario, the plaintiff “must produce
evidence of actual consumer confusion in order to carry its burden.” 67
This difficult burden requires the plaintiff to present “sufficient
evidence that the ‘advertising actually conveyed the implied message
and thereby deceived a significant portion of the recipients.’” 68 Since
the majority of advertising statements at issue in greenwashing claims
likely fall into this category of implicit falseness and misleading
statements, they would therefore be subject to the higher standard of
proof.69 This standard is extremely difficult for a business to satisfy,
and likely impossible for a private consumer to satisfy.70
In addition, the information being conveyed in green marketing
is often beyond both the consumer’s and the court’s knowledge, a
major issue which presents its own challenges when attempting to
prove falsity or satisfy the consumer confusion burden.71 With respect
to this issue, Harvard Law professor Rebecca Tushnet has stated that
courts have held “that terms that consumers do [not] understand, or
only have vague expectations about, cannot be false because they do

Coppolecchia, supra note 59, at 1390-91. See Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382 (“A
literally false statement is one that necessarily will deceive consumers, so evidence
of actual consumer confusion is not required.”); see also Time Warner Cable, Inc. v.
DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that a literally false
advertisement requires “no extrinsic evidence of consumer confusion”).
66
Coppolecchia, supra note 59, at 1391.
67
Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382. In this case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary
injunction to stop the defendant from making false advertisement claims that milk
from cows treated with a certain artificial growth hormone was harmful to humans.
Id. at 384-85.
68
Coppolecchia, supra note 59, at 1390 (quoting United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co.,
140 F.3d 1175, 1182-83 (8th Cir. 1998)).
69
See id. at 1391 (referencing a TerraChoice study that found only one percent of
greenwashing claims involve a literally false claim).
70
See Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382 (stating that consumer confusion is often evidenced
at trial using “fullblown” consumer surveys). What individual consumer plaintiff
would be able to produce such evidence? The answer is none, which is likely another
reason that individual plaintiffs typically lack standing under the Lanham Act.
71
Coppolecchia, supra note 59, at 1392. While likely expensive, parties can certainly
bring in experts to testify to the misleading nature of claims, but the consumer
standing issue still exists.
65
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[not] communicate specific enough information.” 72 In Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc.,73 the District Court stated
that “[c]ourts are not always able to determine whether an advertising
claim is true or false, and where this occurs, the only possible
conclusion is that the moving party has failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the advertising claim is false.” 74
This is an area where the FTC is in a better position than traditional
courts to enforce such actions because of its expertise with advertising
claims.75 In fact, the Procter court agreed that the FTC is better
equipped to handle such claims 76—and this was at a time before the
Green Guides even existed. The argument is even stronger now.
There is simply no effective or reliable course of action under
the Lanham Act for consumers to pursue greenwashing claims. If
private consumer plaintiffs can somehow satisfy the standing issue
(which they likely will not), 77 they will struggle tremendously to
satisfy the requisite burden of proving consumer confusion. 78
Furthermore, courts may not even have the necessary level of expertise
to confidently conclude that a particular claim may indeed be false or
even misleading.79 For the foregoing reasons, the Lanham Act
provides a difficult avenue for businesses to bring suits against
competitors for greenwashing claims, and a near impossible path for
consumers that have been injured by deceptive environmental
marketing.

72

See Tushnet, supra note 34.
588 F. Supp. 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
74
Id. at 1094.
75
Coppolecchia, supra note 59, at 1392.
76
See Procter & Gamble Co., 588 F. Supp. At 1094. (“Courts generally lack the
expertise of the Federal Trade Commission when it comes to evaluating advertising
practices.”). See also Coppolecchia, supra note 59, at 1092-93 (stating that the bestcase scenario for courts, under the Lanham Act, is to address literally false
greenwashing claims, otherwise the FTC is in a superior position to handle impliedly
false greenwashing claims because of its expertise, resources, and ability to solicit
public comment to make a decision on the degree of a statement’s deceptiveness).
77
White, supra note 48, at 330.
78
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 382 (7th Cir. 2018);
Coppolecchia, supra note 59, at 1390.
79
Procter & Gamble Co., 588 F. Supp. at 1094.
73
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Self-Regulation through the Better Business
Bureau’s National Advertisement Division

The most prominent independent self-regulation organization
for the advertising industry is the National Advertising Division
(“NAD”), which follows a general mission to review national
advertising for truth and accuracy. 80 Coincidentally, the birth of the
NAD occurred the year following the first-ever Earth Day.81 It was, in
fact, established in 1971 when the Council of Better Business Bureaus
joined forces with the advertising industry’s trade associations for the
purpose of its formation. 82 In addition to the NAD, which was
designed to serve an investigative function, the National Advertising
Review Board (“NARB”) was formed in tandem to serve as the appeals
mechanism for disputed NAD decisions.83 The NAD originally used
independent monitoring and consumer complaints to draw cases, and
it continues to do so today, but most of its caseload is now comprised
of competitor complaints.84
Between hearing cases from consumers, competitors, and ones
found through its independent monitoring, the NAD handles
approximately 150 cases per year. 85 When the NAD hears competitive

80

Self-Regulation of Advertising in the United States: An Assessment of the National
Advertising Division, A.B.A. SEC. OF ANTITRUST L. 4 (2015),
https://fkks.com/pdfs/SelfRegulationOfAdvertising.pdf [hereinafter NAD Report].
81
Eric Unis, Call to Action: Improve Green Marketing and Avoid Greenwashing,
BBB NATIONAL PROGRAMS (Apr. 22, 2021), https://bbbprograms.org/mediacenter/blog-details/insights/2021/04/22/green-marketing.
82
NAD Report, supra note 80, at 2. The trade association that played the biggest
role in the NAD’s inception was the American Advertising Federation. Id. Also
involved were the Association of National Advertisers and the American Association
of Advertising Agencies. Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 3.
85
NATIONAL ADVERTISING DIVISION, https://bbbprograms.org/programs/allprograms/national-advertising-division# (last visited Feb. 6, 2022). Interestingly,
NAD has developed three methods of review for submitted challenges for claimants
to choose from: Fast-Tract SWIFT, Standard Track, and Complex Track. Id. The
Fast-Track SWIFT option is used for “[s]ingle-issue digital advertising cases” and
decisions are rendered within twenty business days. Id. The Standard Track option
is “[o]pen to a variety of case types with decisions in four to six months.” Id. Finally,
the Complex Track option involves “[c]ases requiring complex substantiation,” and
the time for a decision will be determined by the involved parties. Id. In addition to
differences in eligibility requirements and timelines for a decision, the three options
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challenges, it acts as a neutral arbiter between two parties, ultimately
making a conclusion as to whether the advertising claims at issue are
substantiated.86 Depending on its determination, it may then
recommend that an “advertisement be modified or discontinued.” 87
Since these are only recommendations, decisions made by the NAD
are non-binding and carry no force of law. Parties are technically free
to ignore any NAD recommendation, as participation in NAD
proceedings are voluntary, hence the self-regulation characteristic. 88
In the event a party does choose to ignore a finding or
recommendation, the NAD may elect to refer the case to the FTC for
additional review and potential enforcement. 89 Because it lacks
enforcement authority, as it is not a governmental regulatory body like
the FTC,90 the NAD is also unable to provide monetary relief for
parties bringing claims.91
Unlike the chief shortfall of the Lanham Act, anyone may bring
a greenwashing claim to the NAD; in fact, 2020 saw a significant
increase in the number of deceptive environmental advertising claims,
including ones related to third-party certifications, biodegradability,
and non-toxic products.92 The NAD is actually an incredibly useful
organization and will no doubt continue to provide a useful and
efficient forum for companies looking to self-regulate. Furthermore,
its relationship with the FTC is useful, and can become particularly
effective if the FTC steps up its enforcement actions against
also differ in fee amounts, where “BBB National Program Partners receive a discount
on [such] filing fees.” Id.
86
NAD Report, supra note 80, at 4.
87
Id.
88
Terri Seligman & Hannah Taylor, Navigating the National Advertising Division,
LANDSLIDE
(Mar./Apr.
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landsli
de/2018-19/march-april/navigating-national-advertising-division/#ref6.
89
Id. (“The FTC has long provided full-throated support of self-regulation in the
advertising arena and, specifically, of the work of NAD.”).
90
Coppolecchia, supra note 59, at 1385.
91
Lorance, supra note 35, at 16. However, after policy changes made in 2015, NAD
now has the authority to administratively close a case if, prior to NAD’s issuing a
decision, the challenger and advertiser consent in writing to closure of the case.
Seligman & Taylor, supra note 88. In other words, private settlements are now
allowed. Id.
92
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Greenwashing Claims on the
Rise:
Avoiding
Dirty
Laundry,
JD
SUPRA
(Apr.
19,
2021)
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/greenwashing-claims-on-the-rise-1926530.
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greenwashing claims. Unfortunately, acting on its own, the NAD is
not particularly intimidating. Its proceedings are very low-stakes, as
evidenced by a disclaimer frequently attached to press releases
containing summaries of completed cases, which reads in part: “A
recommendation by NAD to modify or discontinue a claim is not a
finding of wrongdoing and an advertiser’s voluntary discontinuance or
modification of claims should not be construed as an admission of
impropriety.”93 For well-meaning companies, this low-stakes arena
for greenwashing claims is a useful alternative to traditional litigation,
but for companies seeking to intentionally deceive customers, the
NAD is unlikely to serve as an effective deterrent. Where state action,
the Lanham Act, and the NAD have failed with respect to effectively
combating greenwashing, the FTC may provide the best solution.
III.

THE FTC’S GREEN GUIDES
A.

Background

The FTC—an independent federal agency created under the
authority of the FTC Act which President Woodrow Wilson signed
into law in 1914—was tasked with the protection of consumers and
ensuring a healthy competitive market in the United States of
America.94 While some of the FTC’s objectives include enforcing
non-criminal antitrust laws as well as preventing and eliminating
anticompetitive business practices such as coercive monopolies, this
Note will focus on its duty to protect consumers from predatory or
deceitful business practices with respect to environmental marketing
claims.95
In response to greenwashing in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
public hearings were held in 1991 by the FTC to determine if green
marketing guides were necessary and if so, how those guides should

See Press Release, BBB NAT’L PROGRAMS ARCHIVE, NAD Considers
Jurisdictional Issue, Recommends Beech-Nut Discontinue Certain Claims, Finds
Certain Claims Supported After Gerber Challenge (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://bbbprograms.org/archive/nad-considers-jurisdictional-issue-recommendsbeech-nut-discontinue-certain-claims-finds-certain-claims-supported-after-gerberchallenge.
94
Adam Hayes, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), INVESTOPEDIA (last updated July
16, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/ftc.asp.
95
Id.
93

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss3/8

18

Robledo: An American Dream Gone Green

2022

AN AMERICAN DREAM GONE GREEN

955

be formed.96 The following year, in 1992, the FTC issued the first
iteration of its Green Guides. 97 The purpose of the Green Guides is to
prevent marketers from misleading consumers with environmental
claims that are deceptive or inaccurate as per Section 5 of the FTC
Act.98 Specifically, their guidance provides: “(1) general principles
that apply to all environmental marketing claims; (2) how consumers
are likely to interpret particular claims and how marketers can
substantiate these claims; and (3) how marketers can qualify their
claims to avoid deceiving consumers.”99
The Green Guides are applicable to environmental claims made
on product labels, promotional materials, all types of advertising, and
marketing of any kind using any medium. 100 The claims may be
directly or impliedly asserted, whether verbally, symbolically, or
through the use of logos, brand names, or depictions by any means.101
Furthermore, the Green Guides are also applicable to transactions
between businesses. 102
The Green Guides set out examples from the FTC that provide
their view of how a reasonable consumer would interpret a broadly
made environmental claim. 103 Where a specific group of consumers is
targeted by marketers, the FTC provides that it would examine how a
reasonable member of that segment of consumers would interpret the
claim.104
To provide updated guidance on new environmental marketing
claims as well as to respond to trends in green marketing,105 the FTC’s
Green Guides have undergone revisions three separate times: in 1996,
1998, and most recently, in 2012.106 The 2012 revision addressed
96

Israel, supra note 43, at 305.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, Green Guides, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/truth-advertising/green-guides, (last visited Oct. 9, 2021).
98
Id.; VINSON & ELKINS: INSIGHTS, Is Your Green Marketing Deceptive? Look to the
FTC Green Guides to Limit the Risk of an FTC Enforcement Action (Mar. 24, 2021),
https://www.velaw.com/insights/is-your-green-marketing-deceptive-look-to-theftc-green-guides-to-limit-the-risk-of-an-ftc-enforcement-action [hereinafter VINSON
& ELKINS]; 16 C.F.R. § 260.1 (LEXIS 2021).
99
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 97.
100
16 C.F.R § 260.1.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
VINSON & ELKINS, supra note 98.
106
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 97.
97
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some specific greenwashing concerns by breaking down the FTC’s
standards for compostable and biodegradable claims, and presented
guidance for six new environmental marketing categories. 107
Naturally, in the ten years since the last revision, green marketing has
evolved, and the use of new terminology and practices have become
prevalent. Most notably, the Green Guides lack any guidance with
respect to claims using popular marketing terms such as “organic,”
“natural,” and “sustainability.”108
Because of the ever-evolving business marketplace, the FTC
reviews its industry guides and rules every ten years in an effort to keep
them relevant.109 Accordingly, the Green Guides are set to be reviewed
and revised in 2022 as announced and published in the Federal
Register in July of 2021.110 This notice seeks out public commentary
with respect to the Green Guides, which the FTC may use to modify
them in an effort to address any altered conditions or public
concerns.111
B.

Enforceability

The FTC has the authority to prescribe two types of rules under
the FTC Act: (1) interpretive rules; and (2) legislative rules. 112
Whereas legislative rules are legally binding, interpretive rules are
“general statements of policy.” 113
In other words, they are
administrative interpretations of the law that are not independently

107

VINSON & ELKINS, supra note 98. The six new categories include: (1) green
certifications and seals of approval; (2) carbon offsets; (3) free-of claims (e.g., “this
product contains no volatile organic compounds”); (4) non-toxic claims, (5) made
with renewable energy claims; and (6) made with renewable materials claims. Id.
108
Id.
109
BERGESON & CAMPBELL, Regulatory Developments: FTC Intends to Initiate
Review of Green Guides in 2022 (July 6, 2021), https://www.lawbc.com/regulatorydevelopments/entry/ftc-intends-to-initiate-review-of-green-guides-in-2022.
110
Id. Along with the Green Guides, the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, the
Guides Against Bait Advertisement, and the Guides Concerning Use of the Word
“Free” and Similar Representations are set for review by the Commission in 2022.
86
FED.
REG.
35239
(July
2,
2021),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/07/02/2021-13724/regulatoryreview-schedule.
111
BERGESON & CAMPBELL, supra note 109.
112
15 U.S.C. § 57a.
113
Id.
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enforceable because they lack “the force and effect of law.”114 To
enact legislative rules, the FTC has to jump through several procedural
hoops and subject the proposed legislative rules to various tedious
requirements.115 As a result, it tends to enact interpretive rules or
industry guidelines to circumnavigate the cumbersome legislative
process.116
Much like other industry guides, the Green Guides merely
consist of interpretive rules. 117 Accordingly, neither federal, state, nor
local laws are preempted by them. 118 Rather, the Green Guides
describe the types of environmental claims that the FTC may find
deceptive under the FTC Act, 119 although their interpretative status
does not preclude the FTC from taking enforcement action under
Section 5 of the Act.120
When a green claim is inconsistent with the Green Guides, the
FTC may take action if it is believed that all reasonable interpretations
of the claim are false, misleading, or unsupported by a reasonable
basis.121 The FTC may then issue orders prohibiting deceptive
marketing and advertisement, and if those orders are violated, the
company may be fined.122
For approximately two years after the 2012 revision of the FTC
Green Guides, the FTC was rather active in its enforcement actions, at
least compared to the present. 123 In fact, the FTC filed over twenty
114

Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 FED. REG. 63,552,
63,553 (Oct. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Guides].
115
Rotman et al., supra note 40, at 427. Legislative rules promulgated by the FTC
are subject to the procedural requirements laid out in §18(b)(1) of the FTC Act as
well as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act.
Id. In addition, the Administrative Procedure Act must also be adhered to when
promulgating legislative rules. Id.
116
Id. at 427-28 (“[I]ndustry guidelines occupy a middle ground between being truly
voluntary and legally binding.”). For further discussion on this topic as well as how
the Green Guides should be promulgated as legislative rules, see infra Part III.D.
117
Guides, supra note 114.
118
16 C.F.R § 260.1 (2022).
119
Id.
120
Monica J. Stover, Environmental Marketing Claims and the FTC’s “Revised
Green Guides,” 37 MICH. ENV’T L.J. (May 14, 2020, 9:30 AM),
https://connect.michbar.org/blogs/environmental-lawjournal/2020/05/14/environmental-marketing-claims-and-the-ftcs-revise.
121
Id.; VINSON & ELKINS, supra note 98.
122
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 97.
123
VINSON & ELKINS, supra note 98.
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actions during that period.124 Since then, however, the number of
enforcement actions has, unfortunately, steadily dwindled. 125 From
2015-2019, the FTC only filed between two to five cases per year. 126
In the years 2020 and 2021, the FTC did not file a single case against
corporate greenwashers. 127 Whether the change in administration in
2016 was responsible for the lack of FTC action is certainly an
interesting question to ponder, but it is beyond the scope of this Note.
As of May 2022, there are two pending cases (for the same offense):
one against Walmart and one against Kohl’s Inc.128 The two most
recently decided greenwashing cases came down in 2019: one
involving Truly Organic, Inc., and the other involving Lights of
America, Inc.129
C.

Enforcement Actions

For just the second time in history, the FTC brought an action
for a misleading “organic” claim in Federal Trade Commission v.
Truly Organic, Inc., and Maxx Harley Appelman in 2019.130 Truly
Organic, Inc. (“Truly Organic”) is a Florida corporation that markets
its bath and beauty products across the country, selling its products—
some of which it manufactures itself and some of which are purchased
from wholesalers—on its website as well as on third-party sites.131 To
persuade consumers to purchase its products, Truly Organic used
marketing terms such as: “100% Organic Ingredients,” “certified
organic,” “USDA organic,” “100% organic,” and “Truly Organic,”
among others, when in actuality, its products were not organic at all. 132
124

Id.
Id.
126
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 97.
127
Id.
128
See Walmart, U.S. v., FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 2022),
https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/2023173-walmart-usv; see also Kohl’s Inc., U.S. v., FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 2022),
https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/2023171-kohls-inc-usv (stating that the FTC sued both Kohl’s and Walmart for deceptively marketing
rayon textile products as eco-friendly bamboo).
129
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 97.
130
Rotman et al., supra note 40, at 434.
131
Id. at 437.
132
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 4, FTC v. Truly
Organic Inc., No. 1:19-cv-23832 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2019) (stating also that Truly
Organic falsely marketed products as vegan). Furthermore, these invalid claims
125
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The investigation into Truly Organic was initially conducted in
2016 by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) in response to
received complaints about the company’s erroneous use of the USDA
Organic seal.133 The CEO of Truly Organic, Maxx Appelman, claimed
the error was the fault of “previous management” and that it would not
happen again.134 Later that year, after the USDA closed its
investigation, Appelman electronically forged an existing company’s
organic certification document by replacing the company’s name with
Truly Organic’s, and subsequently providing this certificate to third
parties as evidence of Truly Organic’s “certified organic” claims. 135
For the next three years, Appelman continued to make these claims,
even uploading Internet influencer videos on the company’s YouTube
channel promoting different organic claims as well as pictures of its
product packaging also depicting the same claims.136
The FTC informed Truly Organic of its investigation in 2019,
and later filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida seeking “such equitable relief as may be
appropriate in each case, including rescission or reformation of
contracts, restitution, the refund of monies paid, and the disgorgement
of ill-gotten monies.”137 The case concluded just five days after the
complaint was filed, with injunctive orders against the defendant, as
well as a judgment of $1.76 million. 138
The only other action taken by the FTC in 2019 was in Federal
Trade Commission v. Lights of America, Inc.139 Lights of America,
Inc. (“LOA”) is a California corporation that markets, sells, and
distributes lighting products through major national retailers. 140 Since
2008, LOA advertised and sold light emitting diode lamps, commonly

should have violated the false advertising provisions of Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.
133
Id. at 5.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 6.
136
Id. at 6-7.
137
Id. at 2, 8.
138
Rotman et al., supra note 40, at 438. The order prohibits the defendants from
claiming any of their products are organic in any way, as well as barring them from
making any environmental or health claims about their products or services, unless
non-misleading, true, and supported by reliable information. Id.
139
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 97.
140
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3, FTC v.
Lights of America, Inc., No. SACV10-1333 JVS (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2019).
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known as LEDs.141 LEDs generally produce more lumens (brightness)
while expending less wattage (energy use) than customary
incandescent bulbs.142
Usman Vakil, the president of LOA, and Farooq Vakil, its vice
president (“Defendants”), produced various packaging and
promotional materials depicting typical LED parameters in their
bulbs.143 They made claims such as “[y]ou’ll never change your bulbs
again,” or “LASTS 10 TIMES LONGER than 2,000 hour incandescent
bulbs.”144 In truth, the Defendants’ bulbs “produced significantly less
light output than a typical incandescent light bulb at the wattage” they
represented.145 In addition, the bulbs produced considerably fewer
lumens than were represented, and also lasted substantially fewer
hours than was specified in the Defendants’ promotional material. 146
The FTC filed its action in the United States District Court in
the Central District of California and sought “to obtain a permanent
injunction, rescission or reformation of contracts, restitution, the
refund of monies paid, disgorgement of ill-gotten monies, and other
equitable relief” against LOA and the Defendants.147 LOA was
ordered to pay $21 million to the FTC to provide refunds to
consumers.148 The FTC mailed out over 500,000 checks to consumers
who purchased Lights of America bulbs, averaging $50 each.149 In
addition, it was banned from mispresenting material facts about
lighting products.150

141

Id. at 4.
Id. LEDs are known to have a positive sustainable impact on the environment.
143
Id. at 3-4.
144
Id. at 4-5.
145
Id. at 5.
146
Id. at 5-6 (“If the lumen output decreases by more than 10% in the first 1,000
hours, it will not last 30,000 hours. Defendants represented that one of their LED
recessed lamps will last 30,000 hours, but . . . this particular LED lamp lost 80% of
its light output after only 1,000 hours.”).
147
Id. at 1-2.
148
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Sends $68,000 in Refund Checks to Consumers Who
Bought Lights of America LED Light Bulbs and Filed a Claim (July 19, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-sends-68000-refundchecks-consumers-who-bought-lights-america.
149
Id.
150
Id. It is not mentioned whether the major national retailers the Defendants used
had actual knowledge of the deceptive advertising, but none were named as parties
in any matters related to this cause of action.
142
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The cases of Truly Organic and Lights of America are rare in
that the defendants were fined large sums of money; typically, the
resulting remedies from FTC enforcement actions are purely
injunctive.151 In a 2018 enforcement action against Benjamin Moore
& Co., the FTC proved the paint manufacturer was making false claims
regarding its products’ emissions and VOC (volatile organic
compound)152 levels, yet the resulting judgment was merely
injunctive.153 The same types of false environmental claims were
made between 2017-2018 by three other paint manufacturers: Imperial
Paints, LLC; YOLO Colorhouse, LLC; and ICP Construction Inc., and
unsurprisingly, these companies were merely issued injunctive consent
orders.154
In ECM Biofilms, Inc. v. FTC,155 the Sixth Circuit denied the
plastic manufacturer’s petition for review of the FTC’s findings that
ECM falsely marketed its plastics as fully biodegradable within nine
months to five years.156 In the underlying action by the FTC, it was
proven based on survey evidence that a “significant minority of
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 97.
Decision and Order: In the Matter of Benjamin Moore & Co., Inc., Docket No. C4646,
File
No.
1623079
(F.T.C
Apr.
24,
2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1623079_benjamin_moore_deci
sion_and_order_updated_version.pdf (defining VOCs as “any compound of carbon
that participates in atmospheric photochemical reactions, but excludes carbon
monoxide, carbon dioxide, carbonic acid, metallic carbides or carbonates,
ammonium carbonate, and specific compounds that the EPA has determined are of
negligible photochemical reactivity . . . .”).
153
Id. For an example of one of Benjamin Moore’s greenwashed commercials
claiming babies can sleep in a room while it is being painted with its product, see
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N,
Exhibit
A,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/exhibit_a_video_bmftc000482_
0.mp4 (last visited Nov. 27, 2021).
154
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Approves Final Consent Orders Settling Charges that
Four Paint Companies Misled Consumers Through Claims Their Products are
Emission- and VOC-Free (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2018/04/ftc-approves-final-consent-orders-settling-charges-four-paint. In
awarding injunctions, the FTC typically requires the losing party to self-report
compliance notices and recordkeeping, as well as to be responsive to any requests
for further information. Decision and Order: In the Matter of YOLO Colorhouse,
LLC, Docket No. C-4649, File no. 1623082 (F.T.C.
Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1623082_c4649_yolo_colorhous
e_decision_and_order.pdf. However, the author was unable to find if such requests
are often made.
155
851 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2017).
156
Id. at 612.
151
152
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consumers” would believe such an unqualified claim, yet once again,
the consequence faced by the greenwashing offender was injunctive. 157
It would be folly to list every case the FTC has ever brought
against greenwashing offenders that resulted in injunctive penalties;
instead, the focus will be limited specifically to 2016. Of the five
greenwashing companies the FTC brought actions against that year, 158
these are the offenders that received injunctive penalties: (1) TransIndia Products, Inc.;159 (2) The Erikson Marketing Group, Inc.;160 (3)
ABS Consumer Products, LLC;161 (4) Beyond Coastal;162 and (5)
California Naturel, Inc. 163 In case that was not clear enough, all five
of the actions brought in 2016 resulted in injunctive relief—a
punishment not even amounting to a slap on the wrist. In fact, these
157

Id. at 607-09. Dr. Shane Frederick conducted a survey on behalf of the FTC which
found that “adding a ‘biodegradable’ label to a plastic bottle increased the percentage
of respondents who believed the bottle would fully decompose within five years from
13% to between 44% and 49%.” Id. at 606. The results from this “data led the
Commission to conclude that adding the biodegradable label leads ‘a significant
minority of reasonable consumers to believe that the plastic product will degrade
within five years.’” Id. at 607.
158
FED. TRADE COMM’N, Four Companies Agree to Stop Falsely Promoting Their
Personal-Care Products as “All Natural” or “100% Natural”; Fifth is Charged in
Commission Complaint (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/04/four-companies-agree-stop-falsely-promoting-their-personal-care.
159
Trans-India Products, Inc. (doing business as ShiKai) is a California-based
company that marketed its lotion and gel products as “all natural” on various websites
even though the products contained the following synthetic ingredients:
Dimethicone, Ethyhexyl Glycerin, and Phenoxyethanol. Id.
160
Erickson Marketing Group (doing business as Rocky Mountain Sunscreen) is a
Colorado company that promoted its products on its website as “all natural,”
including its popular “Natural Face Stick” which contained the synthetic ingredients
Dimethicone and Polyethylene, among others. Id.
161
ABS Consumer Products (doing business as EDEN BodyWorks) is a Tennessee
company that marketed its hair products on different websites as “all natural,”
including its “Coconut Shea All Natural Styling Elixir” and “Jojoba Monoi All
Natural Shampoo” which contained several synthetic ingredients including
Phenoxyethanol, Caprylyl Glycol, and Polyquaternium-7. Id.
162
Beyond Coastal is a Utah company that sold its “Natural Sunscreen SPF 30” on
its website, describing it as “100% natural” even though it contained Dimethicone.
Id.
163
California Naturel, Inc. is a California company that sold “all natural sunscreen”
on its website even though the product contained Dimethicone. See id.; see also
Opinion of the Commission: In the Matter of California Naturel Inc., Docket No.
9370
(F.T.C.
Dec.
5,
2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/161212_docket_no_9370_califo
rnia_naturel_opinion_of_the_commission.pdf.
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injunctive FTC consent orders are as effective as a small child’s
promise to a parent not to be naughty every again.
In a public statement, former FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra
voiced his surprised pleasure with the Truly Organic judgment since it
was not a result he was used to seeing: “[i]n particular, this resolution
contrasts with those in similar cases involving blatant deception that
harmed both consumers and honest competitors.” 164 The former
Commissioner correctly believes that injunctive relief is not a
sufficient punishment to truly deter companies from greenwashing. 165
With respect to the approach taken in Truly Organic, he stated:
I believe it would be helpful for the Commission to
codify this approach in a Policy Statement addressing
unlawful conduct that is dishonest or fraudulent. In
cases involving such conduct, no-money settlements
are inadequate, and the Commission should commit
itself to exercising its full authority to protect
consumers and honest businesses.166
The Green Guides are inefficient and insufficiently deterrable in their
current existence as a nonbinding roadmap for companies and their
marketing departments to prevent greenwashing. Mr. Chopra is
correct in his assessment, and the best way for the Commission, as he
stated, to “exercis[e] its full authority to protect consumers and honest
businesses”167 is to enact the Green Guides as binding legislation
which can lead to the proper awarding of damages.
D.

From Nonbinding Interpretive Guidance to
Binding Legislative Enforcement

The FTC uses trade regulation rules to tackle commonly
occurring deceptive practices. 168 Originally, the FTC issued such rules
FED. TRADE COMM’N, Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1544655/commisiso
ner_rohit_chopra_statement_on_truly_organic_sept_19_2019.pdf.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law
Enforcement, and Rule Making Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/mission/enforcement-authority [hereinafter A Brief
Overview].
164
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through its power under Section 6(g) of Title 15 of the U.S. Code. 169
After the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act (“FTC Improvement Act”) was passed in 1975,
Section 6(g) was only used “to authorize rules concerning unfair
methods of competition,” and the FTC Improvement Act became the
FTC’s “exclusive authority for issuing rules with respect to unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.” 170 Under the FTC Improvement Act, the
FTC has the authority to enact both interpretive rules—like the Green
Guides—and legislative rules. 171 Specifically, it provides that:
[T]he Commission may prescribe—(A) interpretative
rules and general statements of policy with respect to
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce . . . and (B) rules which define with
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or
deceptive acts of practices in or affecting commerce . .
. .172
Because creating interpretative rules involves significantly fewer
procedural requirements than legislative rules, the FTC issues fewer
binding rules than it used to prior to the passage of the FTC
Improvement Act, but such interpretive rules—specifically the Green
Guides—lack effectiveness for various reasons. 173
Importantly, the Green Guides cannot preempt federal, state, or
local laws.174 Furthermore, since violating the Green Guides
technically does not violate a legally binding rule, the FTC needs to
prove every individual greenwashing offense violates Section 5 of the
FTC Act, as the FTC Act is the exclusive legislative source of the
FTC’s enforcement power over greenwashing claims.175 This is
extremely inefficient, not to mention cumbersome. And it is
particularly frustrating because the Green Guides actually read like
legislative rules.
The Green Guides—as interpretative rules—are supposed to be
“general statements of policy with respect to unfair or deceptive acts
169

Id.
Id.
171
15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1); see also supra text accompanying note 112.
172
Id.
173
Rotman et al., supra note 40, at 427-28; see supra notes 114–116 and
accompanying text.
174
16 C.F.R § 260.1 (2022).
175
Rotman et al., supra note 40, at 429.
170
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or practices in or affecting commerce.” 176 However, they explicitly
and specifically lay out what marketers are and are not allowed to do
to remain within the purview of the FTC Act. 177 The Green Guides,
by definition of what legislative rules are under the FTC Improvement
Act, “define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or
deceptive acts of practices in or affecting commerce.” 178 These blurred
lines between interpretative and legislative rules were even pointed out
in a formal statement by former FTC Commissioner, Mary L.
Azcuenaga.179 When the Green Guides were released in 1992, she
“question[ed] whether the Green Guides were legislative rules
masquerading as interpretative guidance.” 180 Once again, the Green
Guides are in the perfect position to be enacted as binding regulations.
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides the
general procedures required for federal agencies to enact legislative
rules.181 The rulemaking process for the FTC, specifically, also
incorporates the procedural requirements of The FTC Improvement
Act.182 Federal agencies are required to publish a notice of proposed
rulemaking (“NPRM”). 183 However, prior to issuing an NPRM, the
FTC must also publish an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking
(“ANPRM”) in the Federal Register so that interested persons may
submit commentary through “written data, views, or arguments,” and
the ANPRM must also be submitted to specific committees in the
Senate and House of Representatives for review.184 In addition:
[T]he agency must “make a determination that unfair or
deceptive acts or practices are prevalent,” and the FTC
176

15 U.S.C.S. § 57a(a)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-157).
Rotman et al., supra note 40, at 428.
178
15 U.S.C.S. § 57a(a)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-157).
179
Rotman et al., supra note 40, at 428. Mary L. Azcuenaga was the FTC
Commissioner from 1984-1998. Mary L. Azcuenaga: Biography, FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners-staff/mary-l-azcuenaga (last visited
July 2, 2022).
180
Rotman et al., supra note 40, at 428.
181
See 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41546, A
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (2017),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41546 (reporting on the methods by
which federal agencies may enact rules including “formal rulemaking, informal
(notice-and-comment or § 553) rulemaking, hybrid rulemaking, direct final
rulemaking, and negotiated rulemaking”).
182
15 U.S.C. § 57a.
183
Id.
184
Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c).
177
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can only make that determination under either of two
specified conditions: (1) “it has issued cease and desist
orders regarding such acts or practices” or (2) “any
other information available to the FTC indicates a
widespread pattern of unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.” Finally, 30 days before the FTC publishes
its NPRM, the agency must submit the NPRM to the
same congressional committees. 185
Furthermore, the FTC is required to “provide an opportunity for
informal hearing[s].”186 After the period for public commentary
closes, “the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose.” 187 The final rule must
then be published, together with the general statement, at least 30 days
before the rule comes into effect. 188
Is this a lengthy and arduous process? Absolutely. It is obvious
why the FTC has enacted the Green Guides as interpretative rules: it is
easier. After all, the aforementioned procedures do not apply “to
interpretive rules [or] general statements of policy.” 189 However, the
importance of properly deterring greenwashing is worth the procedural
hoops that must be jumped through by the FTC. In addition, the FTC
already complies with some of these procedures even though it does
not need to. As noted, the FTC updates the Green Guides
approximately every ten years and publishes a notice in the Federal
Register seeking public commentary.190 Thus, the notice requirement
has already been partially met in addition to the Green Guides already
being written like binding legislative rules. It is not unreasonable for
the FTC to complete the procedural requirements, given the benefits
that doing so would provide. Violators of legislative rules would be
liable for civil penalties and “any person who [would] violate[] a rule
(irrespective of the state of knowledge) [would be] liable for injury
caused to consumers.”191 Damages for greenwashing offenses could
185

GARVEY, supra note 180, at 4 n.26 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)). Inviting
comments and alternative suggestions can certainly lead to a massive rulemaking
record as any information may be submitted for agency consideration. Id. at 2.
186
15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(1)(C).
187
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
188
Id.
189
5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A).
190
BERGESON & CAMPBELL, supra note 109.
191
A Brief Overview, supra note 168.
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be enforced without the need to prove a violation of Section 5 of the
FTC Act every single time a deceptive environmental offense claim is
filed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Lina Khan, the new chairperson of the FTC, was sworn in in
June 2021 and has been “expected to pursue an aggressive enforcement
policy for consumer protection, including advertisement and
marketing conduct.”192 Yet there have only been two cases filed since
that time and they are essentially the same case as each one involves
the same exact charge. 193 Ms. Khan has an ambitious agenda as
chairperson of the FTC and battling greenwashing is only a fraction of
the agency’s legislative purpose. Since bringing and enforcing a
greenwashing claim through Section 5 of the FTC is a complicated
procedure, some may find the lack of claims brought understandable.
But protecting American consumers—particularly ones trying to be
environmentally responsible—should be a priority.
Corporations are taking advantage of the reputational
advantages that greenwashing affords them. Whether through the
Lanham Act, the NAD, or the current incarnation of the Green Guides,
consistent and effective enforcement of greenwashing claims, not to
mention proper deterrence, is simply not occurring. The Lanham Act
and the NAD are not in the best position to remedy the situation, but
the Green Guides are. Being promulgated as legislative rules by the
FTC is certainly not a simple nor easy feat, but these industry guides
already read like legislative “rules which define with specificity . . .
deceptive acts of practices in or affecting commerce.” 194 Furthermore,
with the announcement of the Green Guides’ revision and seeking of
public commentary in the Federal Register, the FTC already satisfies
part of the notice requirement for enacting legislative rules. Now is
the time for the FTC to use its power to make a difference in the fight
against greenwashing and effectively protect American consumers.
192

Robb Roby, Environmental Advertising for Your Brand: Three Things You Need to Know,
LAW.COM
(Aug.
27,
2021,
02:30
PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2021/08/27/environmental-advertising-for-yourbrand-three-things-you-need-toknow/?kw=Environmental%20Advertising%20for%20Your%20Brand:%20Three%20Things
%20You%20Need%20To%20Know&slreturn=20220603223107.
193
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 128 and accompanying text.
194
15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1).
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There is no time to waste before the opportunity to save the future of
an American Dream gone green will be lost.
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